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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
of the towing industry. The court
determined that Georgia law gives
towing services a great advantage
over owners of towed cars and
creates great potential for unfair
business practices and abuse of the
public. If a car owner fails to pay a
$2 parking fee the law entitles the
towing service not only to remove
the vehicle but to charge an involuntary fee and to deprive the owner of his or her automobile until the
fee is paid.
Reviewing the ordinances,
the court determined that the ordinance requiring towing services to
post fees protected the public from
potential overcharge. By requiring
towing services to accept insured
checks and major credit cards, the
second ordinance protected the
owner from unnecessary deprivation of his or her car while cash is
not immediately available.
Finding the burden on the
towing services to be insignificant,
the court determined that the protective value of the regulation outweighed the inconvenience to the
individual towing services. Therefore, the court held the ordinances
to be clearly reasonable and valid.
Ordinances Did Not Violate United
States Constitution
Article I, Section 8, Challenge.
A-Tow and Porter urged two additional constitutional grounds for
reversing the convictions. First,
they contended that the requirement that wrecker services accept
checks and credit cards violated
Article I, section 8, of the United
States Constitution because the ordinance strove to legislate a change
in legal tender. Article I, section 8,
clause 5, provides Congress with
the exclusive power to coin money
and regulate its value. The court
rejected this argument, finding
that the regulation does not require
services to accept payment in anything but legal tender. In addition,
the debt is discharged when the
towing service receives payment in
legal tender through a third party
institution.
Ordinance Withstands Due
Process Claim. A-Tow and Porter
also argued that the ordinance requiring towing services to accept
"any check which can be insured
by a check approval agency..."
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violated the United States Constitution due process clause because
the ordinance did not define the
word "insured." To determine
whether the ordinance was violative of due process, the court stated
that the proper inquiry is "whether
the statute forbids or requires an
act in terms so vague that people of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application." Porter
at 634. The court held that the
term "insured" is not vague because, reasonably construed, it
means that a check approval agency will indemnify the towing service if bank account funds are
insufficient.
Sufficient Evidence That
Checks Were Tendered and
That Signs Were Not Posted
A-Tow and Porter posed two
evidentiary arguments. First, they
contended that there was no evidence that a check was properly
tendered. While the court conceded that no fully drafted check was
entered into evidence at trial, the
court observed that the witnesses
had testified that they had stopped
writing checks when A-Tow told
them that the checks would not be
accepted. The court additionally
noted that the ordinance does not
require formal tender and that
Georgia law does not necessitate
formal tender where the towing
company tells the consumer that
the check will be refused. The court
held that violation of the ordinance occurred when A-Tow indicated that a check, if written,
would be refused.
Secondly, A-Tow and Porter
asserted that there was insufficient
evidence that the required signs
were not properly posted. The
court, however, found sufficient
testimony to support the conviction for failure to post fees.
Sheila M. Hanley

SOUTH CAROLINA
HOME BUYERS MAY
RECOVER ONLY
AGAINST BUILDERS
UNDER IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY
In a recent case, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina denied
recovery to a new home purchaser
who brought suit for breach of
implied warranty of habitability
against the seller, who was also the
builder's lender. In Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & MFG. Co., 384
S.E.2d 730 (S.C. 1989), the court
held that, absent knowledge of concealed defects, the seller-lender
was not liable to the buyer on an
implied warranty of habitability
theory. However, the court also
held that the builder could be liable
to the buyer under an implied
warranty of service theory.
Factual Background
On July 21, 1977, Columbia
Lumber & Manufacturing Company ("Columbia Lumber") sold a
new home to John Kennedy
("Kennedy"). Columbia Lumber
had been the materials supplier to
the builder of the house, Charles
Crumpton ("Crumpton") of Rainbow Construction Company. Columbia Lumber had taken no part
in the actual construction of the
house. When Crumpton could not
pay Columbia Lumber for the supplies, Columbia Lumber filed a
mechanic's lien on the property.
This lien put Columbia Lumber in
a lender's position with regard to
Crumpton. Eventually, Columbia
Lumber took a deed in lieu of
foreclosure on the property and
paid off Crumpton's outstanding
mortgages. In order to recoup its
losses from Crumpton's default,
Columbia Lumber sold the house
to Kennedy, but received less than
the amount Crumpton owed for
materials.
Approximately six years after
the sale, Kennedy spotted a crack
in the brick veneer of the house.
Almost two years later, an engineer
employed by Kennedy to inspect
(continued on page 90)
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the crack informed Kennedy that
he believed the crack resulted from
a defective foundation. On September 27, 1985, Kennedy filed
suit against Columbia Lumber
based on theories of implied warranty of habitability and negligence; later, he dropped the negligence action. The Common Pleas
Court of Richland County directed
a verdict for Columbia Lumber,
and the South Carolina Supreme
Court took this appeal.
The South Carolina Supreme
Court Decision
Liability of Construction
Lenders. The Supreme Court of
South Carolina noted that Roundtree Villas Ass'n v. 4701 Kings
Corp., 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46
(1984), involved a construction
lender somewhat similar to Columbia Lumber. In Roundtree Villas, the lender's financially troubled builder deeded housing units
it had constructed to a selling
corporation. These units were sold
to purchasers who later noticed
defects in the buildings and sued
the lender on theories of negligence
and implied warranty of habitability. The court held that the lender
could not be held liable in tort for
the builder's defective work. The
lender also was not liable under a
warranty of habitability theory because the lender was not the seller
of the housing units.
The court noted, however,
that the Roundtree Villas lender
was in a somewhat different position from Columbia Lumber in the
instant case. The lender in Roundtree Villas undertook to repair the
defects in some of the housing
units; Columbia Lumber did not
take on such a responsibility. Additionally, unlike the Roundtree Villas lender, Columbia Lumber was
also the seller. Nevertheless, the
court applied Roundtree Villas to
the instant case and held that
whether or not a party to the sale of
housing units, a mere lender is
generally not liable to the home
buyer under an implied warranty
of habitability theory.
The court distinguished parties who act only as lenders from

those lenders who expressly ensure
habitability or conceal information
regarding building defects. A lender who is also a developer or
builder of the units may be liable if
the lender makes express representations or conceals defects from the
buyer, or if the lender plays a
substantial role in constructing the
units.
Builder and Seller Liability.
The court next set out to define
and clarify the scope of builder and
seller liability in South Carolina by
analyzing the appellate court decision in Carolina Winds Owners'
Ass'n, Inc. v. Joe Harden Builder,
Inc., 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897
(Ct.App. 1988). In Carolina
Winds, condominium unit purchasers sued the builder when they
discovered cracks in the exterior
walls. The builder, who had not
actually sold the units, was sued
under theories of negligence and
implied warranty of habitability.
The court of appeals held that
because the builder was not also
the seller, he could not be held
liable under an implied warranty
of habitability theory. Neither
could he be held liable in tort,
according to the court of appeals,
because the "economic loss" rule
precludes liability in tort where the
only damage suffered from a defective product is damage to the product itself.
The Supreme Court of South
Carolina found that the result
reached in Carolina Winds was
contrary to South Carolina's policy
of extending protection to new
home purchasers. The court reviewed the legal history of builders' liability to home buyers for
defective workmanship and noted
the state's trend toward protecting
the new home buyer. The court
opined that the modem home buyer is usually in an unequal bargaining position with the seller, and
asserted South Carolina's longstanding policy of caveat venditor
in this context. The court of appeals had denied recovery to the
home buyer in Carolina Winds
because the builder was not also
the seller and because damages
were exclusively economic. The

Supreme Court of South Carolina
rejected this result because it failed
to protect the home buyer. The
court held instead that the buyer
should generally be allowed to
bring suit against the builder, the
seller, or both the builder and the
seller.
In rejecting Carolina Winds,
the court emphasized that because
a warranty of habitability stems
from the sale of the house, such a
warranty cannot be traced to a
builder who is not also the seller.
The court stated, however, that an
implied warranty of workmanlike
service arises when a builder contracts to build the house. The new
home buyer may hold the builder
liable under the theory of implied
warranty of service, even where the
buyer did not deal directly with the
builder.
Finally, the South Carolina
Supreme Court considered the appellate court's assertion that the
economic loss rule precluded
builder liability under the tort theory of negligence. The court concluded that the economic loss rule
often results in an unfair decision.
The court held that while builders
who violate contractual duties are
liable only in contract, builders
who violate legal duties are liable
both in contract and in tort. The
court noted that builders have
many legal duties, such as a legal
duty to construct buildings in accordance with building codes and
industry standards or, when there
are no codes or standards to apply,
a duty not to construct housing
that the builder knows or should
know will create risks of physical
harm. A builder who violates these
legal duties may be held liable in
tort, and the plaintiff is not required to prove physical harm.
Such a builder, said the court, may
be held liable for the diminution in
the value of the house, or for
physical harm suffered.
Stephen Kirkwood
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